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Gendered laws curb Olympic success
Legal gender equality is key for female participation in the labour market. The
association between women’s legal empowerment and success in sports is another
manifestation of that. Using the Women Business and the Law (WBL) index, Simeon
Djankov and Eva Yiwen Zhang construct a simple measure of Olympic success for
female athletes: the number of medals per one million female population. They find
that an improvement in the WBL score by 10 points is associated with one additional
medal by a woman athlete for the average country.
Countries that treat women on equal legal footing with men tend to have more success in sports. As one measure of
such success, the number of medals sportswomen receive at Olympic Games increases with the rise of equality of
women and men under the law.
In recent research we find that legal equality is associated with fewer female workers in positions of vulnerable
employment, and with greater political representation for women. The association between legal empowerment by
women and success in sports is another manifestation of the relation between law and practice.
Gender equality and Olympic medals
The Women Business and the Law (WBL) index captures the inequality in legislation that a woman faces as she
navigates her working life, from the time she can enter the labour force through to retirement. Countries receive a
score ranging from zero to one hundred based on the level of legal gender equality. A score of one hundred implies
that there are no legal inequalities between men and women in the areas covered by the index. The global average
WBL score in 2020 is 76.1, implying that, on average, women around the world have approximately three quarters the
rights of men when it comes to laws affecting their economic opportunity. Only ten countries in the world — Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden — receive a perfect score of
100, all high-income OECD countries.
The data used in this analysis cover the past 13 Olympics Games, with the first competition in the sample taking place
in 1972. (The Olympic participants and medal count data prior to 2021 are retrieved from Han and Noland (2020) and
the 2021 data are retrieved from Olympics.com [last accessed September 9, 2021]. Countries that have participated in
less than half of the games since 1970, i.e., less than 7 out of 13 games, are removed from the sample. The medal
count for countries that did not participate in particular Olympics is marked as missing.) We construct a simple
measure of Olympic success for female athletes: the number of medals per one million female population.
One noteworthy exclusion from the sample is that of East Germany. The historical record for women’s Olympic
success was distorted by East Germany’s vigorous doping program, which hurt athletes’ lives beyond athletics. Noland
and Stahler (2014) estimate that the East German doping program was responsible for 17 per cent of the medals
awarded to female athletes in the 1970s and 1980s. We hence exclude East Germany from the analysis.
The countries that have had the most success at Olympic Games over the past half century are shown in Figure 1. The
Bahamas won the most female medals per million female population, with an average of 3.7 medals per Olympics.
This success is followed by Jamaica with an average of 2.8 female medallists, and further by New Zealand, Australia,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Samoa, Hungary, and Belarus. The average WBL score for these top ten
performers is 88 in 2020, 12 points above the global WBL average.
Figure 1 – Success of women athletes at Olympics, by country (averaged over Olympic Games since 1972)
We next correlate the female medals’ count with several country characteristics. These come in three groups, and they
are added to the analysis:
A measure of the extent of democracy;
A measure of the country’s legal origin;
And a measure of prevalent religion.
The correlation coefficients between the measure of success in sports and the WBL score under different model
specifications are presented in figure 2. The basic model represented by the top bar in the chart captures the link
between medals won and the WBL score three years ahead of the Olympic year, while controlling for year fixed effects
and a country’ income per capita. The bars below represent the partial correlation while adding another group of
controls to the previous model, so that the bottom bar cumulates year fixed effect, income per capita, democracy
scores, legal origin, and religion characteristics. In previous research we also use several proxies for geography,
though their coverage is smaller than for other explanatory variables. Their usage further reduces the size of the WBL
coefficient.
Figure 2 – Correlation between the WBL index and female success at Olympics
Note: The figure displays the beta coefficient and the associated confidence interval in a regression model that
estimates women’s Olympic success. The top bar represents the coefficient on the WBL index variable under
regression model that controls for a country’s lagged income level and year fixed effect. The second bar from top adds
measures of the extent of democracy; the third bar adds a measure of the country’s legal origin; and the bottom bar
adds a measure of the dominant religion. Source: Authors’ calculations.
The partial coefficient on the WBL score using the first outcome measure (medals per million female population)
implies that an improvement in the WBL score by 10 points is associated with one additional medal by a woman
athlete for the average country. (The average female population for the 206 countries participating in the 2020 Tokyo
Olympic is 20 million.) Take the United States as an example: A hypothetical improvement in the WBL score by 9 more
points (to a perfect 100) would correspond to 7 more Olympic medals. This partial correlation remains statistically
significant even after adding controls of the level of democracy, religion, and legal origins, though the size of the
coefficient is reduced by about half.
We next run a sensitivity analysis to account for the impact of boycotts. The 1970-2021 sample period includes three
Olympic boycott years (1976, 1980, and 1984). The major absences of 1980 in Moscow (the United States and their
allies) and 1984 in Los Angeles (the Soviet Union and their allies) are likely to balance out the results on women’s
success in medals. However, the 1976 Montreal Games boycott, where 28 African countries withdrew from
competition, may boost our findings. The analysis is rerun excluding these three Olympic Games, and we find the WBL
coefficients to be largely unchanged and to remain statistically significant under all specifications. For example, the
value of the WBL coefficient from the basic model (i.e., the top bar in Figure 2) falls from 0.0046 to 0.0045, while
remaining significant at the 1 per cent level.
Reform impetus
These results are unlikely on their own to provide impetus for legal equality reform. Put together with previous findings,
however, they enhance the case for legal change: even in such physically strenuous careers as sports, the law is
associated with better actual performance by women in the labour market. Such change may not only bring the first
female medals to countries like Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan, and Togo (so far countries without Olympic glory for female
athletes) but create a better work environment for the millions of women whose jobs do not make the news.
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